
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## Mandatory Review Case # NLJ 93-189 Central Intelligence Agency Document #\_150 Intelligence Information Cable

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		PAGES
STATE/INR	DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC MXXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	CIA/NMCC
This materia	contains information affecting the National Jefense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws 111 d 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to the unauthorised person is prohibited by law.	18, V.S.C.
	040	WE!
	THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.	Heatles 7
S-E-G-R	29 [18 1] Z	
	DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966	1.5 <del>(e)</del> 3.4(b)(1)
COUNTRY	NORTH VIETNAM	J. 1(D)( //
DOI	DECEMBER 1966	
SUBJECT	VIEWS EXPRESSED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE	9
	BY JAMES RESTON ACCURATELY ASSESSED HANOI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS	1.5( <b>c)</b> 3.4(b)(1)
	AND THAT SECRET CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE	}
ACQ		
SOURCE		1.5(e)
300RCL		3.4(b)(1)
-		
-		
1.		1.5(e)
		3.4(b)(1)
ВОТН НА	NOI AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WERE	
IMPRESS	SED BY THE ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON IN THE 26 DECEMBER (SIC)	
INTERNA	TIONAL EDITION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES ENTITLED "WASHINGTON:	
		-

(dissem controls)



1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

S-E-PR-E-T

(dissem controls)

THE CONFLICT OF POWER, IN THAT IT WAS A GOOD REFLECTION

OF THE OFFICIAL MOOD PREVAILING TODAY IN HANOI ON THE QUESTION OF

OPENING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF A CESSATION

OF THE POMBINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM. PARTICULARLY REFERRED TO

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

RESTON'S STATEMENT THAT HANOI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THERE CAN BE NO

NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE BOMBINGS STCP AND SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE

STATEMENT OF HANOI'S BASIC POSITION IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e) THE UNCONDITIONAL 3.4(b)(1) CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD IN A SHORT TIME LEAD TO THE WILLINGNESS OF HANDI TO OPEN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT CAUSE HANOI TO LOSE FACE OR APPEAR TO BE SURRENDERING TO AN ULTIMATUM, AND IF THE 1.5<del>(e)</del> 3.4(b)(1) BOMEINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, THIS WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED IT SHOULD BE EFFECT. POSSIBLE, BY WAY OF SECRET DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM TO MAKE A SECRET AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE BOMBINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, HANOI WOULD PROMISE AFTER A SHORT PAUSE TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION TALKS. 1.5(c)

DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT

REPORT CLASS SPERET

1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

S-E-CA-E-T